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ABSTRACT 
Security technology is advancing at a remarkable rate. While advances in 
security technology have the potential to help prevent gun violence and 
terrorism, the same technology is also capable of intruding upon our per-
sonal freedom and personal right to privacy. Development of the “Patscan” 
marks the beginning of new generation of weapons detection security tech-
nology. It is far more sophisticated than any weapons detection technology 
to date and gives rise to significant constitutional concerns. Current Su-
preme Court jurisprudence has yet to address the Fourth Amendment con-
cerns inherent within the government’s use of advancing security technol-
ogy to search citizens of the United States. A narrow state action doctrine 
complicates the issue by undermining the Fourth Amendment’s privacy 
protections. This note is intended to fill the gap in the Fourth Amendment 
conversation created by the emergence of the Patscan, while also illustrat-
ing the consequences of applying the exceptions to the state action require-
ment narrowly. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“New technologies test the judicial conscience. On the one hand, they hold 
out the promise of more effective law enforcement, and the hope that we 
will be delivered from the scourge of crime. On the other hand, they often 
achieve these ends by intruding, in ways never before imaginable, into the 
realms protected by the Fourth Amendment”1 
 
When the Fourth Amendment was drafted and adopted, searches were phys-
ical acts carried out by a government agent rummaging through an individual’s be-
longings, entering an individual’s property, or requiring the individual to reveal ob-
jects carried on his person.2 At the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, law 
enforcement would have had to physically stop an individual and demand to see 
the contents of his pockets or bag to detect contraband carried on his person. But 
today the ability to search an individual using advanced technology without any 
physical invasion is becoming more and more of a reality. A variety of security tech-
nologies are available, or will soon be available, to both government and private 
security forces and law enforcement officers. The familiar metal detector allows se-
curity personnel at checkpoints, such as in airports, to search individuals for metal 
objects in hopes of preventing weapons from entering sensitive areas.3 Handheld 
                                                          
 1. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 2. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.’ (internal citation omitted) As explained, for most of our history the Fourth Amendment was un-
derstood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, 
and effects’) it enumerates.” (emphasis added)).  
 3. Michael Bernzweig, Understanding and Selecting Walk Through Security Metal Detectors, 
METALDETECTOR.COM, https://www.metaldetector.com/learn/buying-guide-articles/security-use/under-
standing-selecting-walk-through-security-metal-detectors (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
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concealed object detection systems are available for police forces to utilize while 
on patrol.4 Security robots equipped with thermal imaging may detect suspicious 
heat signatures given off by a person’s body,5 which could be a weapon carried on 
their person. Even security patrol drones can now be equipped with thermal imag-
ing and microwave sensor technology, allowing them to follow and scan any indi-
vidual within their patrol range.6 Technology allows for a search that is far more 
sophisticated than the physical inspection of an individual’s belongings envisioned 
by the drafters of the Fourth Amendment. Because Fourth Amendment caselaw has 
been slow to grapple with the constitutional implications of these modern technol-
ogies and devices, legal scholars have often stepped in to fill the gap.7 
The Patscan, developed by PatriotOne Technologies (PatriotOne), is an emerg-
ing weapons detection technology that makes the previously discussed technolo-
gies seem as crude and unsophisticated as the physical searches they were intended 
to replace.8 The Patscan is a device that does far more than indicate whether an 
individual might be carrying a weapon.9 It positively identifies whether an individual 
is carrying a concealed weapon, describes what type of concealed weapon the indi-
vidual is carrying with a startling degree of specificity, and sends the information to 
all on-duty security personnel via mobile application, SMS, or computer interface.10 
The Patscan has the potential to revolutionize the appearance, perception, and ef-
ficacy of security checkpoints in a diverse set of applications. However, just like the 
technologies before it, the Patscan will challenge our understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment, creating yet another gap in Fourth Amendment caselaw. 
                                                          
 4. Thermal Vision Concealed Object Detection, THERMAL MATRIX USA, http://www.thermalma-
trixusa.net/# (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). These concealed object detection systems can be used to detect 
a variety of threats to both the public and law enforcement officers, including explosives, firearms, flamma-
ble liquids, and knives. Id. The concept of a handheld weapons detection system or “gun detector” dates 
back to the mid-1990s. See David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New 
Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (1996). For an in-depth discussion of the Fourth Amendment 
implications of handheld gun detection technology see id. See also Sean K. Driscoll, “The Lady of the House” 
vs. A Man with a Gun: Applying Kyllo to Gun-Scanning Technology, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 601 (2013). 
 5. See KNIGHTSCOPE, https://knightscope.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
 6. Aerial Protection Service, APTONOMY, http://www.aptonomy.com/ (last visited Mar. 24, 
2019). 
 7. See, e.g., Driscoll, supra note 4 (filling the Fourth Amendment gap regarding handheld “gun 
detectors”); Michael Ferraraccio, Metal Detectors in the Public Schools: Fourth Amendment Concerns, 28 J. 
L. & EDUC. 209 (1999) (filling the Fourth Amendment gap regarding the use of metal detectors in schools); 
Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2016) (filling the 
Fourth Amendment gap regarding police use of drones to conduct surveillance). 
 8. See Patscan CMR Data Sheet: Covert Weapons Detection System, PATRIOTONE TECH., 
http://sengex.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Patriot1-Spec-Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) 
[hereinafter PatriotOne, Data Sheet]. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Overview: Patscan Product Demonstration Video, PATRIOTONE TECHNOLOGIES, https://pa-
triot1tech.com/solutions/overview/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) [hereinafter PatriotOne, Product Demon-
stration Video]. 
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This note is intended to grapple with the constitutional concerns raised by the 
development of the Patscan and to fill the gap in Fourth Amendment caselaw and 
literature that the Patscan creates. Part II of this note will provide background in-
formation on the Patscan itself by briefly describing its features and capabilities, as 
well as comparing and contrasting the Patscan to current checkpoint security tech-
nology, such as metal detectors and millimeter wave scanners.11 Part III provides 
relevant background information on the current state of the state action doctrine 
and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.12 Part IV will then apply the state action 
doctrine and current Fourth Amendment caselaw to the use of the Patscan device 
in a number of common contexts, such as in airports, government buildings, high 
schools, and sports stadiums, to evaluate the constitutionality of its use in those 
contexts.13 Finally, Part V will conclude and briefly discuss the need for judicial re-
evaluation of the trend favoring security over privacy when it comes to emerging 
technologies and the Fourth Amendment, as well as the important role the state 
action doctrine should play in protecting privacy in the 21st century.14 
II. BACKGROUND ON THE PATSCAN 
According to PatriotOne, “P[atscan] CMR is the world’s most advanced tech-
nology for covert screening and detection of concealed weapons.”15 PatriotOne 
also claims that it developed the Patscan “as an effective tool to combat active 
shooter threats before they occur . . . thereby diminishing the epidemic phenomena 
of active shooters across the nation.”16 
A. What Makes the Patscan Unique? 
The Patscan uses cognitive microwave radar technology to detect and identify 
weapons.17 Cognitive microwave radar works through the emission of microwaves 
in the direction to be searched.18 These waves bounce off the human body at a 
different level than they do when being reflected off of concealed objects, allowing 
the device to determine whether someone is carrying an object.19 Once the differ-
ent frequencies are received by the Patscan device, “sophisticated software algo-
rithms analyze the data to identify any concealed objects.”20 The system then com-
pares the signal to a database of pre-loaded weapon patterns and, if the weapon 
pattern is already present in its database, identifies the weapon to a high degree of 
specificity.21 The device not only positively identifies the weapon, but it also 
                                                          
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Patscan CMR: Cognitive Microwave Radar, PATRIOTONE TECHNOLOGIES, https://pa-
triot1tech.com/solutions/patscan-cmr/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) [hereinafter PatriotOne, Patscan CMR]. 
 18. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.  
 19. See PatriotOne, Patscan CMR, supra note 17. 
 20. See id.  
 21. See id.  
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provides detailed information about the weapon when available.22 For example, if 
a gun is detected that matches one of the profiles stored in the Patscan’s database, 
it can provide information such as the caliber of the firearm, the capacity of the 
magazine, the barrel length, action type, grip size, and the type of metal the gun is 
machined from.23 
The “cognitive” part of the process is that the device “learns” over time by 
adding unidentified weapon patterns to its database as it encounters them.24 Then, 
the device will share the new weapon pattern data across the system’s network so 
that all Patscan devices will be capable of detecting the new weapon type.25 The 
Patscan has an effective range of about two meters, making it most useful in entry-
ways and high foot-traffic areas.26 
B. Patscan vs. Metal Detectors vs. Millimeter Wave Scanners 
Because the Patscan is most likely to be used in applications similar to metal 
detectors and millimeter wave scanners, its features are best described when 
viewed in comparison to those security technologies. The Patscan is similar to metal 
detectors and millimeter wave scanners in the fact that all three devices are used 
to screen individuals with the goal of detecting weapons.27 Similarities between the 
Patscan and other stationary weapons detections systems end there, however.  
Metal detectors are very effective at doing what they are designed to do, de-
tect metal.28 Metal detectors indiscriminately detect any metal object that disrupts 
the magnetic field produced by the device as an individual passes through the scan-
ner.29 Objects such as gum wrappers, pens, key rings, metal eye glasses, and 
                                                          
 22. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10. 
 23. See id.  
 24. See PatriotOne, Patscan CMR, supra note 17. 
 25. See id.  
 26. PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8. 
 27. Metal detectors are likely one of the first security devices that come to mind for many when 
thinking about security checkpoints in airports and certain secure government facilities. Metal detectors are 
commonplace security devices with a primary purpose of detecting metal objects that could be used as 
weapons including knives, guns, and certain explosives. See Bernzweig, supra note 3. Millimeter wave scan-
ners are full-body scanners that search for concealed weapons or devices using radio waves. See Markham 
Heid, You Asked: Are Airport Body Scanners Safe?, TIME (Aug. 23, 2017), http://time.com/4909615/airport-
body-scanners-safe/. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) began implementing millimeter 
wave scanners in airports in 2010 in response to the notorious underwear bomber debacle in 2009. See id.; 
see also Michael Crowley, Beware “Underwear 2”: TSA Chief Offers Rare al Qaeda Bomb Details, TIME (July 
19, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/07/19/beware-underwear-2-tsa-chief-offers-rare-al-qaeda-
bomb-details/. For anyone who has encountered a millimeter wave scanner at an airport security check-
point, they are “the ones you stand in with your feet apart and your hands above your head.” Heid, supra. 
Unlike metal detectors, millimeter wave scanners also detect non-metal threats, such as plastic explosives. 
Id. 
 28. See MARY W. GREEN, NAT’L INST. JUST., THE APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE USE OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 
IN U.S. SCHOOLS 65 (1999). 
 29. See id. at 78–81. 
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watches can all potentially set off the alarm.30 Because many weapons such as 
knives and guns are made of metal, metal detectors are also fairly effective at pre-
venting weapons from passing through a security checkpoint undetected.31 
Millimeter wave scanners, on the other hand, are becoming more controver-
sial as evidence of their ineffectiveness continues to mount. In response to a TSA 
request for comments during its formal rulemaking process, many commenters ex-
pressed concern about the effectiveness of millimeter wave scanning devices at de-
tecting weapons.32 At least one report leaked from the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Office of Inspector General in 2015 found that after the implementation 
of these devices, the TSA failed to detect explosives and handguns 96% of the 
time.33 It is unclear how much of this failure percentage can be attributed to human 
operator error versus the millimeter wave scanners themselves.34 
In contrast, the Patscan provides much more information than a metal detec-
tor and has a higher success rate than a millimeter wave scanner. Unlike metal de-
tectors, the Patscan is capable of differentiating between benign metal objects and 
weapons.35 Also, unlike the millimeter wave scanner, which may be failing to detect 
explosives and handguns up to 96% of the time, the Patscan has a “true positive” 
rate of 91.6%, meaning that it fails to detect potential weapons only 8.4% of the 
time.36 The technology that allows the Patscan to positively identify concealed 
weapons raises serious privacy concerns. The specificity of the information that the 
Patscan can provide about a weapon is alarming. While a metal detector or milli-
meter wave scanner can merely indicate that an individual might be carrying a 
weapon, the Patscan affirmatively determines that an individual is carrying a 
weapon. The Patscan’s ability to compare information from the scan against a da-
tabase will reveal a large amount of information about the concealed weapon being 
carried by an individual.37 For an individual legally carrying a concealed weapon, 
disclosure of the intimate details about their weapon to anyone with a Patscan in-
stalled on their property may be disconcerting. 
There are several other differences between the Patscan and conventional se-
curity technologies. First, the Patscan does not require a direct line of sight; mean-
ing that it can be installed covertly in walls, desks, floors, and other discreet areas.38 
It follows then, that if installed discreetly the Patscan could potentially allow secu-
rity personnel to electronically search individuals who pass by the hidden Patscan 
device without their knowledge or cooperation. Metal detectors and millimeter 
                                                          
 30. See id. at 78–79.   
 31. See generally id. at 65. 
 32. Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 81 Fed. Reg. 11364, 11376–77 
(2016). 
 33. See Aviation Security Challenges: Is TSA Ready for the Threats of Today?: Hearing Before the 
Comm. of Homeland Sec., 114th Cong. (July 29, 2015) (opening statement of Michael McCaul, Committee 
Chairman, R-Texas); Jennifer Scholtes, Price for TSA’s Failed Body Scanners: $160 Million, POLITICO (Aug. 17, 
2015, 5:09 AM EDT), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/08/airport-security-price-for-tsa-failed-body-
scanners-160-million-121385. 
 34.  See Scholtes, supra note 33.  
 35. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10.  
 36. See PatriotOne, Patscan CMR, supra note 17. 
 37. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10. 
 38. See id. 
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wave scanners on the other hand require the cooperation of the individual to be 
searched because they must pass through the device to be scanned.39 The potential 
for covert installation of the Patscan also raises privacy concerns because individu-
als passing by the device likely will be unaware that they are being scanned. Indi-
viduals who are being unwittingly scanned by the Patscan do not have a meaningful 
opportunity to avoid the search by choosing not to enter an area. 
Also, unlike metal detectors and millimeter wave scanners, the Patscan does 
not require human operators.40 Since the Patscan does not require human opera-
tors, security personnel can be refocused to where they are needed most rather 
than stuck with the tedious task of screening individuals as they enter a secured 
area. This also reduces the potential for human error in the screening process, 
which is a concern when using metal detectors and millimeter wave scanners.41 
Furthermore, the Patscan itself does not generate an image of the person be-
ing scanned,42 but a USB camera can be attached to the Patscan to take a picture of 
individuals who are positively identified as carrying a concealed weapon.43 Metal 
detectors also do not generate an image of the person being scanned, but millime-
ter wave scanners were initially quite controversial because of privacy concerns 
raised by the detailed images generated of the body of the person being scanned.44 
Finally, there will likely be a price difference between the Patscan and milli-
meter wave scanners. PatriotOne has not yet provided pricing for a single Patscan 
unit, but their promotional materials describe millimeter wave scanners as “expen-
sive” and the Patscan as a less expensive alternative.45 Millimeter wave scanners 
have an acquisition cost of about $175,000 per unit.46 Metal detectors are about 
$10,000 per unit.47 Depending on the price PatriotOne sets for Patscan, it may be a 
cost effective alternative to conventional security technology. 
Overall, when considering effectiveness and price, PatriotOne has positioned 
its Patscan device in such a way that is likely to promote widespread adoption by 
                                                          
 39. See Current Technologies, PATRIOTONE TECH., https://patriot1tech.com/threats/current-tech-
nologies/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).  
 40. See PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8. 
 41. See, e.g., Scholtes, supra note 33 (discussing the possibility of human error contributing to at 
least part of the 96% failure rate of millimeter wave scanners). 
 42. See PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8. 
 43. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10. 
 44. See Julie Accardo & M. Ahmad Chaudhry, Radiation Exposure and Privacy Concerns Surround-
ing Full-Body Scanners in Airports, 7 J. RADIATION RES. APPLIED SCI. 198, 199 (2014) (explaining that the TSA was 
pressured to change millimeter wave scanners to produce less exposing images). 
 45. See PatriotOne, Data Sheet, supra note 8.  
 46. BART ELIAS, CONG. RES. SERV., R42750, AIRPORT BODY SCANNERS: THE ROLE OF ADVANCED IMAGING 
TECHNOLOGY IN AIRLINE PASSENGER SCREENING 3 (2012). While the acquisition cost of millimeter wave scanners 
is about $175,000 per unit, that amount only reflects the purchase price. The annual cost associated with 
deploying and operating millimeter wave scanners is roughly $655,000 per unit deployed. Id. at 3–4. 
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security forces around the world. Whether PatriotOne can successfully navigate the 
many obstacles faced by businesses attempting to launch products into the global 
marketplace remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that the emergence 
of the Patscan, and the technology powering it, has created a new gap in the current 
landscape of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Having explained the basic fea-
tures, design, and purpose of the Patscan, Part III of this note turns to the state 
action doctrine and the current Fourth Amendment landscape. 
III. BACKGROUND ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
There are essentially three main parts to a search analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment. First, the challenged conduct must be evaluated under the state ac-
tion doctrine, because most of the Constitution––including the Fourth Amend-
ment––only applies to the government.48 Second, if state action is present, it must 
be determined whether the challenged conduct constitutes a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.49 Finally, if the challenged conduct is a search, 
it will be evaluated for reasonableness.50 Before explaining each of these steps in 
more detail, it is helpful to highlight the debate over what exactly the Fourth 
Amendment requires. 
A. What Does the Fourth Amendment Require? 
The Fourth Amendment provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.51 
The Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses: the Reasonableness Clause, 
which requires that searches and seizures be reasonable, and the Warrant Clause, 
which, at a minimum, lays out the specific requirements of a valid warrant.52 There 
is an ongoing debate about whether the two clauses are intended to be read as an 
interconnected whole or as two separate parts.53 The warrant preference interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment holds that the Warrant Clause is interrelated to 
the Reasonableness Clause, and in addition to setting the requirements for a valid 
                                                          
 48. See infra Section III.B. 
 49. See infra Section III.C. 
 50. See infra Section III.D. 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 52. Cynthia Lee, Criminal Law: Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing 
Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1413 
(2010). 
 53. Id. at 1408–13. 
 
2019 THE PERFECT STORM: HOW NARROWING OF THE STATE 
ACTION DOCTRINE, INCONSISTENCY IN FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CASELAW, AND ADVANCING SECURITY 




warrant, also implies a warrant requirement.54 Under this view, warrantless 
searches are per se unreasonable unless a warrant exception applies.55 
More recently, another view that the Fourth Amendment contains two dis-
tinct and separate clauses, has regained some traction within the Supreme Court.56 
This separate clauses57 approach to the Fourth Amendment was the competing 
view to the warrant preference approach for the first sixty years of the twentieth 
century.58 Under this separate clauses view, the Reasonableness Clause and the 
Warrant Clause are completely independent and separated by the presence of the 
word “and” situated between them.59 When interpreted under this view, 
                                                          
 54. David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant Requirement, 96 B. U. L. 
REV. 425, 427 (2016). 
 55. Id. at 426; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”). 
 56. Lee, supra note 52. At least one recent Supreme Court Justice Scalia, advocated that the 
Court return to the separate clauses viewpoint. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and 
seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’ What it explicitly states regarding 
warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirement of their use.”). 
 57. The “separate clauses” approach is also commonly referred to as the “reasonableness view.” 
Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 
MISS. L. J. 1133, 1139 (2012). 
 58. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582. In his concurring opinion in Acevedo, Justice Scalia briefly ex-
plained the clash between the warrant preference view and the separate clauses view before advocating 
for the latter: 
Although the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it 
is of course textually possible to consider that implicit within the requirement of reasonable-
ness. For some years after the (still continuing) explosion in Fourth Amendment litigation that 
followed our announcement of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914) (parallel citations omitted), our jurisprudence lurched back and forth between impos-
ing a categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone (internal citations 
omitted). By the late 1960s, the preference for a warrant had won out, at least rhetorically. 
(internal citations omitted).  
The victory was illusory. Even before today’s decision, the “warrant requirement” had be-
come so riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable. In 1985, one commen-
tator cataloged nearly 20 such exceptions . . . . Since then, we have added at least two more . 
. . . Our intricate body of law regarding “reasonable expectation of privacy” has been devel-
oped largely as a means of creating these exceptions . . . . 
Unlike the dissent, therefore, I do not regard today’s holding as some momentous departure, 
but rather as merely the continuation of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been with us 
for years . . . . There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our minds, and unless 
the principles we express comport with the actions we take. 
In my view, the path out of this confusion should be sought by returning to the first principle 
that the “reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that 
the common law afforded . . . . 
Id. at 582–83. 
 59. See Lee, supra note 52, at 1413. 
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reasonableness becomes the only requirement for a constitutional search and the 
Warrant Clause does not require that searches and seizures be preceded by valid 
warrants.60 Instead, the Warrant Clause only limits the circumstances under which 
warrants may be issued by requiring that warrants be based on probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation and listed with particularity “the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”61 
On the surface, the debate appears to be settled in favor of the Fourth Amend-
ment containing an implied warrant requirement.62 However, underneath the sur-
face a trend towards requiring only reasonableness undermines the implied war-
rant requirement. As Justice Scalia pointed out, the growing number of exceptions 
to the warrant requirement have rendered it nearly “unrecognizable.”63 While the 
Court has not expressly abandoned the warrant preference view, it has espoused 
that “the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness” with increasing 
frequency.”64 While doing so, it has continued to expand both the number and 
scope of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. These developments lend cre-
dence to the argument that in more recent Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
cases, the Court only pays lip service to the implied warrant requirement before 
ultimately evaluating the search based on reasonableness.  
The debate has become even more prominent as modern surveillance tech-
nology has been increasingly adopted by law enforcement.65 Because it has chosen 
not to expressly adopt the separate clauses approach up to this point despite ample 
opportunity to do so, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will change course 
anytime soon. Yet, it also seems unlikely that the Court will diminish the warrant 
exceptions that it has already created. The solution to this jurisprudential morass is 
a topic worth consideration. But the lengthy discussion necessary to do it justice is 
outside the scope of this note.66 This note will analyze the constitutionality of 
searches conducted using the Patscan through the lens of reasonableness, because 
that is the direction the Supreme Court appears to be trending.67 
B. State Action Doctrine: Who Does the Fourth Amendment Apply To? 
A preliminary question to ask when evaluating a set of circumstances through 
the lens of a Fourth Amendment claim is: who must comply with its requirements? 
The Fourth Amendment applies to both the federal government and to the states.68 
Generally, the Fourth Amendment only applies to actions of the states and the 
                                                          
 60. Id. While a warrant is not required under the separate clauses view, the presence of a valid 
warrant prior to a search or seizure still has an impact on the reasonableness prong of the Fourth Amend-
ment search analysis. See infra Section III.D. (discussing the reasonableness of searches). 
 61. See Lee, supra note 52 at 1413; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 62. See Acevedo, 580 U.S. at 582; see also supra text accompanying note 58. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Lee, supra note 5752, at 1143. 
 65. Gray, supra note 54, at 429. 
 66. For a more in-depth discussion of the separate clauses and warrant preference debate see 
Gray, supra note 57. See also Lee, supra note 52. 
 67. See Lee, supra note 52.  
 68. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies 
to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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federal government, whereas, generally the actions of private individuals do not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.69 This concept is known as the “state action” doc-
trine.70 However, the actions of private individuals can become state action if the 
actions fall within one of the exceptions to the state action requirement.71 Concep-
tually, the state action doctrine is not difficult to understand. In application, how-
ever, it is much more difficult to determine when private conduct may become state 
action.72 There are two exceptions to the state action requirement that the Court 
appears to have settled on; the public function exception and the entanglement 
exception.73 These two exceptions, when applicable, work to recharacterize the pri-
vate party’s actions as “state action,” consequently requiring that the private 
party’s conduct conform to the requirements of the Constitution.74 
i. The Public Function Exception 
The public function exception in its original form appeared fairly broad in 
scope. One of the first cases that helped create the public function exception was 
Marsh v. Alabama.75 In Marsh, a police officer arrested a Jehovah’s Witness in 
Chickasaw, Alabama, a private company-owned town, for standing on the sidewalk 
and distributing religious materials to people without a permit.76 The town had “all 
the characteristics of any other American town,” except that it was owned by the 
Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.77 The Court reasoned that the company town of 
Chickasaw was being allowed by the state of Alabama to oversee a community as if 
                                                          
 69. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974). Professor Donald Crowley explains 
state action doctrine as follows: 
The state action doctrine ranks as one of the more illusive doctrines of constitutional law. As 
an abstract concept it is fairly easily explainable, but its application to actual situations is much 
more problematic. As a concept of federal constitutional law, the doctrine applies to the no-
tion that constitutional rights act as restrictions on government actors but not private individ-
uals, businesses, or groups. Thus, the ban against unreasonable searches restricts government 
intrusions into one’s personal effects, but does not limit the ability of a snoopy neighbor to 
investigate your basement activities. While the neighbor might be subject to a trespassing 
charge, he cannot be held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Donald Crowley, Student Athletes and Drug Testing, 6 MARQ. SPORTS. L. J. 95, 100 (1995). 
 70. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349–50.  
 71. See Crowley, supra note 69, at 103 (discussing the ways in which private action might be-
come state action). 
 72. As one commentator from the 1990s put it, “State action is a sea in which everything else 
floats.” C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 421, 422 (1993). 
If state action is a sea, its waters are murky indeed. 
 73. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352. 
 74. See Sean D.G. Camacho, Can You Hear Me Now? Time to Consider Whether Cell Phone Pro-
viders Are State Actors, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 257, 261–62 (2016).  
 75. Marsh, 326 U.S. 501. 
 76. See id. at 502–04. 
 77. Id. at 502. 
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it were a public entity.78 Creating the public function exception in perhaps its broad-
est form, the Court held that the U.S. Constitution was enforceable against the com-
pany town of Chickasaw because it was filling the role of a public entity.79 
Later, courts including the Burger Court and Rehnquist Court increasingly nar-
rowed the scope of the public function exception.80 In 1974, the Court held that the 
public function exception applies when a private entity exercises a power that is 
“traditionally and exclusively reserved to the State.”81 In doing so, the Court nar-
rowly applied the public function exception, holding that a private company provid-
ing electricity to citizens was not state action, despite heavy state regulation of the 
industry, because the service was not one the state had “traditionally” and “exclu-
sively” provided.82 
ii. The Entanglement Exception 
The entanglement exception applies when the “state’s involvement with [a] 
private party has been so pervasive that it significantly facilitates or supports the 
challenged actions of the private party.”83 For example, in Burton v. Wilmington 
Parking Authority, the Court held that the state was sufficiently involved with a dis-
criminatory private actor when it leased a business space within a state-owned 
parking structure to the private actor.84 The Court reasoned that the state’s place-
ment of its “power, property, and prestige” behind the discriminatory actions of the 
private actor were enough that the private individual’s actions could not be consid-
ered “purely private.”85 While it is not always clear how and when the Court will 
find a government actor to be sufficiently entangled with the actions of a private 
individual, it is apparent that more government involvement is required than mere 
licensing, funding, or regulation of the private actions.86 
                                                          
 78. See Camacho, supra note 74, at 260. 
 79. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 509. 
“In our view the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation 
of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to 
justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict 
their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State 
statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal punishment on appellant for 
undertaking to distribute religious literature in a company town, its action cannot stand.” 
 80. See Crowley, supra note 69, at 102. 
 81. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974); see also Camacho, supra note 74, 
at 262. 
 82. See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352–54. Interestingly, when laying out the traditional and exclusively 
reserved state test in Jackson, the Court relied upon four cases where it had applied the state action doctrine 
to private actors to hold their actions unconstitutional. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (election); 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (election); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town); 
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (municipal park). 
 83. See Crowley, supra note 69, at 102. 
 84. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 716–17 (1961). 
 85. Id. at 725. 
 86. See Camacho, supra note 74. See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) 
(holding that a state selling a liquor license to a privately-owned social club did not cause the state to be 
substantially involved in the private discriminatory actions of the club). 
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C. What is a Search for Purposes of the Fourth Amendment? 
i. Evolution of Fourth Amendment Searches 
The meaning of the word “search” as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court 
has evolved over time. In its early decisions, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence relied upon a property-rights based framework.87 Under the 
property-rights based framework, a search occurs whenever the government phys-
ically intrudes upon a constitutionally protected area, such as trespassing upon an 
individual’s property to obtain information.88 The landmark case from the property-
rights based era of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is Olmstead v. United States.89 
In Olmstead, the Court explained that for a defendant to show his Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated there must have been “an official search and seizure of 
his person, or such seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual 
physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”90 
In other words, without a physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area such 
as his body or home, there simply could not be a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
The property-rights based framework was the dominant framework for a pe-
riod spanning from the late-eighteenth century when the Fourth Amendment was 
ratified, up until the second half of the twentieth century.91 In the 1960s, however, 
the Supreme Court began to move away from the property-rights based ap-
proach.92 By 1967, two cases, Warden v. Hayden and Katz v. United States, marked 
what was thought to be the end of the property-rights based Fourth Amendment 
framework.93 While Warden was decided first, Katz is often regarded as the seminal 
case marking the Supreme Court’s departure from the property-rights approach to 
the Fourth Amendment.94 In Katz, the Court tells us that “the Fourth Amendment 
                                                          
 87. Christine S. Scott-Hayward et al., Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Societal Expectations of Pri-
vacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 23 (2015). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) (holding that wiretapping a telephone 
line outside of a defendant’s house to intercept and listen to telephone calls coming from the telephone 
inside the house was not a search because the wiretapping was done without any physical intrusion onto 
his property).  
 90. Id. at 466. 
 91. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Se-
curity?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309, 320 (1998). 
 92. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 87, at 24. 
 93. See Clancy, supra note 91, at 320. See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (elim-
inating the “mere evidence” distinction and rejecting the idea that property interests are the subject of the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection); Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 94. See, e.g., Charles E. MacLean, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Doctrine is Rudderless in the Digital Age, Unless Congress Continually Resets the Privacy Bar, 24 ALB. L. J. SCI. 
& TECH. 47, 55 (2014) (referring to Katz as a seminal decision); Seth Capper, United States v. Jones and the 
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protects people, not places” and that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.”95 However, “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”96 Put another way, pri-
vacy, not property, is the subject of the Fourth Amendment’s protection.97 
Justice Harlan’s famous concurrence in Katz gave us the test that has been 
used for the last fifty years by the Supreme Court in determining whether a search 
has occurred.98 He said that the Fourth Amendment protects areas in which a per-
son has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”99 The test for determining whether 
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is twofold.100 First, “a person 
[must] have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.”101 Second, “the 
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”102 
In cases following Katz, the Court further articulated the “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” test, explaining that the test has both a subjective prong and an objec-
tive prong.103 Until 2012, Justice Harlan’s two-pronged “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test was the dominant method by which the Supreme Court determined 
whether a search had occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
ii. Reinvigoration of the Property-Rights Based Framework 
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court reinvigorated the property-rights 
based approach.104 The Supreme Court further clarifies in Jones that Katz cannot 
have replaced the trespass test for determining whether a search has occurred be-
cause it is an “irreducible constitutional minimum.”105 Instead, Katz supplements 
the property-rights approach in cases where there has not been a physical trespass 
but an individual’s expectation of privacy has nevertheless been invaded.106 By re-
placing the property-rights based approach with the two-part framework from Katz 
and then reviving the property-rights approach in Jones, the Supreme Court appears 
to have come full circle in determining what constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. However, after nearly 200 years of attempting to define what a search 
is, the Court is not just back where it started. Instead of the pre-1967 property-
rights approach being the only test for identifying a search, the Court now has two 
                                                          
Debate Over Warrantless GPS Surveillance on Vehicles, 2 ALA. C. R. & C.L. L. REV. 175, 179 (2011) (referring to 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz as seminal). 
 95. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Scott-Hayward, supra note 87, at 24. 
 98. Id. at 25. 
 99. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. 
 100. Id. at 361.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland., 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); see also Scott-Hayward, supra note 
87, at 25 (explaining that the two-part test from Justice Harlan’s concurrence “has become known as the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test”). 
 104. See Scott-Hayward, supra note 87, at 25.  
 105. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 106. See id. at 411–12.  
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frameworks working in tandem to afford the Fourth Amendment’s protections to 
both people and constitutionally protected places. 
In sum, after Jones, a search has occurred either when there has been an in-
trusion upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy (Katz), or when the 
government physically invades a constitutionally protected area for the purpose of 
obtaining information (Jones).107 A determination that a search has taken place is 
only the first step in the analytical framework of the Fourth Amendment search 
analysis, however. Once Katz or Jones has been used to determine that a state ac-
tion does indeed constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the next inquiry is reasonableness. 
D. Only Unreasonable Searches are Proscribed 
The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches, rather, it only prohibits 
searches that are “unreasonable.”108 Whether a search is reasonable “depends on 
all of the circumstances surrounding the search . . . and the nature of the search . . 
. itself.”109 In other words, there is no talismanic approach to determining the rea-
sonableness of a search. Instead, the Court must delve into the facts of each case 
to evaluate a search’s reasonableness. The Court is not without guidance, however. 
Through its precedent, the Court has crafted a balancing test for assessing the rea-
sonableness of a search.110 Under this balancing test, a search’s reasonableness is 
evaluated “by balancing its intrusion on [an] individual’s Fourth Amendment inter-
est against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”111 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s view of the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements may be evolving.112 But under current Fourth Amendment case law, 
“warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, except, of course, when they are 
not.”113 The best way to ensure the reasonableness of a search is to obtain a war-
rant and execute it properly. Ideally, the government would always obtain a warrant 
before conducting a search. But the reality is that in many circumstances waiting 
for a judicially approved warrant is not practical. Consequently, the government 
conducts many searches without first obtaining a warrant. In acknowledgement of 
the government’s needs to search some individuals without waiting for approval of 
                                                          
 107.  See id. at 407; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 108. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); 
see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). 
 109. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 
(1985)). 
 110. See id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
 111. See id. (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654). 
 112. See supra Section II.A. 
 113. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 573 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2173 (2016) (explaining that the warrant requirement “is subject to a number of 
exceptions”). 
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a warrant, the Supreme Court has created nearly two dozen exceptions to the war-
rant requirement.114 
The reasonableness of warrantless searches hinges primarily on whether they 
fit within one of the nearly two dozen exceptions to the warrant requirement. These 
exceptions operate by tipping the scale in favor of the government when the Court 
is balancing an individual’s privacy interest against the government’s needs.115 The 
exception tips the scale either by reducing the privacy interests of the individual or 
by amplifying the government’s needs.116 One such exception, the administrative 
search exception, is likely to govern the use of the Patscan in some contexts.117 An-
other exception, the special needs exception, will govern the use of the Patscan in 
schools.118 Discussion of the administrative search exception and the special needs 
exception will be deferred to Section IV.C. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PATSCAN SEARCHES 
Under most circumstances, use of the Patscan is likely to be found constitu-
tional under existing Fourth Amendment caselaw. This is because a narrowing of 
the state action doctrine precludes a full-fledged Fourth Amendment analysis in 
many cases. In the cases that do survive the state action doctrine expanding excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, too much weight is given to the government’s 
interests, all but ensuring that use of the Patscan will be constitutional. In the first 
step of the analysis, the constitutionality of using the Patscan to scan people for 
weapons will depend, in part, on the security personnel behind the machine.119 If 
the personnel using the Patscan are state actors, we move on to the second step of 
our Fourth Amendment analysis.120 If not, the scan will not trigger the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections.121 Upon a finding of state action, we must then deter-
mine whether a scan from the Patscan is a search. If so, the search’s constitutional-
ity will depend upon its reasonableness.122 If the scan is not a search, it will not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.123 
                                                          
 114. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582–83 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 115. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619–20 (citations omitted): 
In most criminal cases, we strike this balance in favor of the procedures described by the War-
rant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search 
or seizure in such a case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial war-
rant issued upon probable cause. We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, 
‘when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ When faced with such special needs, we have not 
hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the 
warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular context.  
 116.  See id. 
 117. See infra Section IV.C.i. 
 118. See infra Section IV.C.ii. 
 119. See supra Section III.B.  
 120. See supra Section III.B. 
 121. See supra Section III.B. 
 122. See supra Sections III.C–D. 
 123. See supra Section III.C. 
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A. Is Use of the Patscan State Action? 
Whether using the Patscan to scan an individual for weapons qualifies as state 
action will, like nearly every other aspect of Fourth Amendment analysis, depend 
upon the circumstances. While the Patscan is still in the early stages of the product 
life cycle and is not yet widely available, it is not difficult to conceptualize potential 
applications for its use. Airports, schools, government buildings, sports stadiums, 
large event venues, casinos, restaurants, private clubs, and movie theaters are just 
a few possible applications. For the purpose of a state action analysis, the many 
circumstances in which the Patscan might be used can be categorized into three 
basic groups: purely private actors, quasi-state actors, and clear state actors. 
The first category consists of circumstances where purely private actors utilize 
the Patscan. Due to the possible applicability of the entanglement and public func-
tion exceptions, this category is the smallest of the three.124 Only when the conduct 
is purely private would use of the Patscan fall into this category. For example, there 
would be no state action if an individual installed the Patscan at the front door to 
his house. Use of the Patscan under these circumstances would not qualify as state 
action because there is little to no government involvement. Home security is not a 
service that has been “traditionally” and “exclusively” provided by the state. Nor 
can it reasonably be argued that the state substantially facilitates or supports an 
individual’s conduct when he chooses to purchase and install the Patscan.125 Private 
business owners installing the Patscan at their place of business would also fall into 
this category if another private party owned the building or property on which their 
business is located.126 Private clubs, movie theaters, or restaurants all might fall into 
this category. Unless the private place of business, like the restaurant in Burton, 
contracted with the state or leased state property, it would be unlikely to qualify as 
state action.127 Thus, by definition, when use of the Patscan is purely private, it does 
not qualify as state action and cannot violate the Fourth Amendment.  
The second category consists of those circumstances where private actors are 
using the Patscan, and the state is intertwined with the private actors in a way that 
requires a state action doctrine analysis. The private actors under these 
                                                          
 124. The entanglement and public function exceptions cause otherwise private conduct to be re-
characterized as “state action.” See supra Section III.B.  
 125. Perhaps, it could be argued that the state facilitates the individual’s purchase of the Patscan 
by building roads or encouraging interstate commerce. But such an incidental facilitation of private conduct 
is not substantial and is not within the ambit of the entanglement exception. See supra Section III.B.2. and 
accompanying text; see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (holding that sale of a 
liquor license to a private organization was not substantial facilitation of private conduct). 
 126. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); but see Burton, 365 U.S. at 724–
25 (explaining that a small private business such as a restaurant may still be a state actor when it engages 
in a mutually beneficial lease of a business space from the state). 
 127. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 723. 
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circumstances could be referred to as quasi-state actors.128 Such circumstances will 
arise when security personnel operating the Patscan are doing so on private prop-
erty and are privately employed but the state is still significantly involved in some 
fashion. Sports stadiums, large event venues, and casinos are some examples of 
places that may fit into this category. In these cases, the courts will apply the public 
function and entanglement exceptions to determine whether the actions of the pri-
vate actor are considered state action.129 A difference in holdings between two dis-
trict courts regarding sports stadiums demonstrates how the courts have narrowed 
the state action doctrine over the past few decades. 
In Ludtke v. Kuhn, the New York Yankees Clubhouse prohibited female report-
ers from entering the Yankees’ locker room to interview players immediately after 
games.130 A female reporter brought a discrimination claim against the New York 
Yankees and several other defendants, and one of the key issues was whether the 
clubhouse policy was state action.131 The New York Southern District Court looked 
to the entanglement exception in holding that the policy was state action.132 The 
court found it significant that the Yankee Clubhouse was leasing the portion of the 
stadium from the City of New York, which was the owner of the entire Yankees Sta-
dium.133 Comparing the case to Burton, the court emphasized the “symbiotic rela-
tionship” between the Yankee Clubhouse and the City of New York.134 
In contrast, in Stark v. Seattle Seahawks, the Washington Western District 
Court held that private security forces conducting pat-down searches of fans enter-
ing the Seahawks’ stadium was not state action.135 Two fans, who were subjected 
to the pat-down searches, brought a civil action for deprivation of their Fourth 
Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.136 This court also looked to the 
                                                          
 128. Under Burton, such actors would undoubtedly be considered state actors. See generally Bur-
ton, 365 U.S. at 715. 
 129. See supra Section II.B. 
 130. Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 87–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 131. Id. at 87–88, 93. The other defendants included “Bowie Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball; 
Leland MacPhail, President of the American League of Professional Baseball Clubs . . . The Mayor of the City 
of New York; The Commissioner of Parks and Recreation for the City of New York; and The Director of the 
Economic Development Administration of The City of New York.” Id. at 88. 
 132. Id. at 93. 
 133. Id. The City of New York owned the stadium because it had exercised eminent domain to 
acquire it several years earlier. Id. at 92. 
 134. Ludtke, 461 F. Supp. at 93. The court further explained:  
The facts of the case at hand so nearly resemble those of Burton that there can be little doubt 
that state action exists . . . Here, as in Burton, the place where the discriminatory acts occurred 
is owned by the state (the City of New York) and leased pursuant to special legislative provisions 
to the Yankees. In this case, as in Burton, the facility involved is maintained and improved with 
the use of public funds. The Court noted in Burton that the relationship of the public and private 
entities in that case placed them in a relationship of interdependence. The same observation 
can be made on these facts, where the annual rentals to be paid to the City for use of the sta-
dium depend directly on the drawing power of Yankee games, and the City has in turn invested 
substantial sums of public money to enhance that drawing power by modernizing and improv-
ing the stadium itself. 
Id. at 93–94. 
 135. Stark v. Seattle Seahawks, No. C06-1719JLR, 2007 WL 1821017 (W.D. Wash. June 22, 2007). 
 136. This is known as a “Section 1983” claim. See id. at *1. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The 
action was brought against several named defendants, including The Seattle Seahawks (NFL team), Football 
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entanglement exception in determining whether the private action could be fairly 
attributed to the state.137 Just like in Ludtke, the plaintiffs pointed to evidence of a 
symbiotic relationship between the private actors and the Stadium Authority,138 in-
cluding the fact that the private actors leased the stadium from the Stadium Au-
thority.139 They also pointed to the fact that the Stadium Authority shared revenue 
with the private actors and had “an equity stake in the Seahawks.”140 But, relying 
on Supreme Court precedent, the court took a narrow approach to the state action 
doctrine, explaining that a symbiotic relationship is only shown when the specific 
action in question is mutually beneficial to both the state and private actors.141 In 
the court’s view, the entanglement exception did not apply because the Stadium 
Authority did not benefit from the pat-down searches.142 
In light of this narrowing of the state action doctrine, it seems unlikely that 
the Court would find use of the Patscan in sports stadiums or similar venues to be 
considered state action so long as the security personnel are private employees and 
the facility is being leased by a private actor. The possible benefits of a scan from 
the Patscan are the same as those from a pat-down search. The purpose is to detect 
concealed weapons and protect the safety of everyone within the stadium or 
venue. If promoting the safety of patrons does not benefit the government owner 
of the facility simply because a private company has leased it from the government 
and employed its own private security personnel, then it is unlikely that use of the 
Patscan in this context would be considered state action. As long as the entangle-
ment exception is narrowly construed to require that the specific actions being chal-
lenged be the source of the “symbiotic” relationship between the private and state 
actor, use of the Patscan in sports stadiums and similar venues likely is not state 
action. 
The public function exception offers another possible route to a finding of 
state action, but it has been met with mixed results across jurisdictions. When a 
private security officer has plenary power to make arrests under state law, some 
jurisdictions have found that the authority makes him a state actor.143 In circuits 
                                                          
Northwest (the owner of the Seahawks), First & Goal (“a Washington corporation that leases [the stadium] 
for the benefit of the Seahawks”), the Stadium Authority (a public entity that owns the stadium), and Lor-
raine Hine (the Chair of the Stadium Authority’s Board of Directors). Stark, 2007 WL 1821017, at *1–2. 
 137. Stark, 2007 WL 1821017, at *7–8. 
 138. The Stadium Authority was a public entity created by The Stadium Act for the purpose of 
constructing, owning, remodeling, and operating the Seahawks Stadium. Id. at *1–2. 
 139. Id. at *4. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at *5–6. 
 142. Id. at *6–7. One might argue that the Stadium Authority benefited from the pat-down 
searches because it made fans more likely to purchase tickets because it made them feel more secure. More 
ticket purchases would mean more revenue and an increase in the value of the Stadium Authority’s equity 
stake. In fact, the plaintiffs did make that argument, but the court dismissed the apparent benefit as “pure 
speculation.” Stark, 2007 WL 1821017, at *6.  
 143. See, e.g., Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 
plenary arrest authority transforms a private security guard into a state actor via the public function 
 
328 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 55 
 
that have held that private security forces were state actors, the courts reasoned 
that a private security officer with plenary arrest authority is serving a public func-
tion because police power is one “traditionally and exclusively” held by the state.144 
Of course, in those jurisdictions, the issue can probably be avoided entirely by 
simply not providing private security forces with plenary arrest authority. Instead, 
the private security officers can exercise their power to make a citizens’ arrest with-
out being considered state actors.145 Absent a Supreme Court opinion addressing 
this split, a finding of state action under the public function exception may depend 
on the jurisdiction in which the private security forces with arrest authority are us-
ing the Patscan. This potential for a patchwork of jurisdictions holding that use of 
the Patscan by private security personnel either is or is not state action is less than 
desirable considering the fundamental constitutional rights at stake. 
Finally, the third category consists of circumstances where state action is 
clearly present. Such circumstances arise when the security personnel operating the 
Patscan are themselves government agents. The Transportation Security Admin-
istration (TSA)146 in airports, employees at state-run public schools, state and fed-
eral law enforcement officers, and security personnel in government buildings all 
fall into this category of state actors. When the Patscan is used under the circum-
stances that arise in this category, there is no question as to the presence of state 
action or the applicability of the Fourth Amendment. 
B. Is Use of the Patscan a Search? 
Regardless of the circumstances under which the Patscan is used, the method 
the device uses to scan an individual remains the same.147 If using the Patscan to 
scan an individual in an airport is a search, so too is using the Patscan to scan some-
one in a sports stadium or on a street corner. The question then, is whether bounc-
ing microwaves off an individual and interpreting the reflected waves to determine 
whether they are carrying a weapon constitutes a search. 
i. Physical Trespass Test 
A scan from the Patscan likely does not physically trespass upon constitution-
ally protected areas in the sense contemplated in Jones or Olmstead. The trespass 
and search at issue in Jones was the attaching of a GPS tracking device to the un-
dercarriage of an individual’s vehicle and the subsequent tracking of his location.148 
In holding that installment of the tracking device was a search, the Court 
                                                          
exception). But see United States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 688–89 (4th Cir. 2010) (disagreeing with the holding 
from Romanski and finding that plenary arrest authority alone is not enough to change a private citizen to 
a state actor). 
 144. See Romanski, 428 F.3d at 637, 651. 
 145. See Day, 591 F.3d at 689. 
 146. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is a federal agency created by Congress to 
handle security at airports and improve security for other modes of transportation. See Aviation and Trans-
portation Security Act of 2001 §101, 49 U.S.C. §114(a), (d)–(e) (2012). 
 147. See PatriotOne, Product Demonstration Video, supra note 10 (explaining how the Patscan 
operates to scan individuals). 
 148. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403. 
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emphasized the physical nature of reaching under the vehicle to place the tracking 
device.149 In Olmstead, the Court held that wiretapping an individual’s phone was 
not a search under the physical trespass test so long as the government agent did 
not step onto the individual’s property (a constitutionally protected area) to tap the 
telephone line.150 Olmstead illustrates the principle that not only must the act in 
question be physical in nature, it must also intrude upon a constitutionally pro-
tected area.151 Olmstead likely would be decided differently if it were before the 
Court today, because the modern Court is equipped with both the physical trespass 
test and the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test from Katz.152 But, Olmstead is 
still useful in illustrating the nature of the physical trespass test reinvigorated by 
Jones. 
The Patscan is used to scan both an individual’s body and those items that she 
is wearing or carrying.153 An individual’s “person” is one of the protected areas enu-
merated within the Fourth Amendment,154 and “has . . . been extended to include 
clothing, items in pockets, undergarments, socks, and other extensions of the 
body.”155 The Court has not provided a universal definition of “effects,”156 but it has 
held that parcels,157 luggage,158 and vehicles,159 are all constitutionally protected 
“effects.” The Court has also distinguished that effects are personal property, not 
real property.160 Between the Court’s slightly expansive interpretation of “person” 
and its holding that luggage and parcels are effects, it seems clear that at minimum, 
an individual’s body and the objects she is wearing or possessing are constitution-
ally protected areas. Thus, when scanning an individual for concealed weapons, the 
Patscan is being used on the constitutionally protected areas contemplated by the 
Court. 
The problem is that the scan conducted by the Patscan is not physical in na-
ture. Unlike in Jones where the government agent physically intruded upon an indi-
vidual’s “effect” by reaching under the vehicle to attach a GPS tracking device, the 
Patscan merely sends and receives electronic signals, requiring no physical intrusion 
upon the individual’s “person” or “effects.”161 Since the Patscan does not physically 
                                                          
 149. Id. at 410–11.  
 150. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464–66. Perhaps if the telephone line was owned by the defendant 
the wiretapping would have constituted a physical trespass in the eyes of the Court. 
151. See id.  
 152. See supra Section III.C.ii. 
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intrude upon the individual’s “person” or “effects,” its electronic scans are not 
searches under the physical trespass test from Jones. Perhaps in anticipation of de-
vices such as the Patscan, Justice Scalia explained in Jones that “[s]ituations involv-
ing merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass . . . remain subject 
to Katz analysis.”162 
ii. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test 
A scan from the Patscan is a search under the reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy test from Katz. The first prong of the test, that the individual has a subjective 
expectation of privacy, will almost always be satisfied by the fact that the individual 
carrying a concealed weapon chose to conceal it.163 The second prong of the test is 
more complex. This prong of Katz, if interpreted literally, gives rise to a troublesome 
question. Can an individual ever have a reasonable, societally recognized expecta-
tion of privacy in the objects he carries into an area he knows is protected by secu-
rity? While this question can be asked in the context of security at government 
buildings, sports stadiums, schools, or any other areas in which the Patscan might 
be used, airports are particularly useful in illustrating this concept. 
In our post-9/11 world, everyone who has flown and many who have never 
flown understand that to get into the boarding area of an airport they will have to 
pass through a security checkpoint. The current routine is essentially the same at 
every airport and is easily described: arrive two hours before your flight, get in line 
at the security checkpoint, take off your shoes, empty your pockets into a bin, get 
out your laptop or iPad and put it in a separate bin, place your bag on the conveyer 
belt to be x-rayed, and walk through the metal detector or millimeter wave ma-
chine. If a man walks into an airport expecting to get on a plane and he is carrying 
a revolver in his briefcase, we, as a society, expect him to be discovered. Substitute 
out the metal detector or millimeter wave machine for the Patscan, and that expec-
tation does not change. Assuming all of this is true, how could we possibly conclude 
that society is prepared to recognize the man’s expectation of privacy as reasona-
ble? 
The courts, even before 9/11, acknowledged that interpreting Katz in this way 
leads to problematic results.164 In response to the government’s assertion that an 
individual could not have “a reasonable expectation of privacy” in his carry-on lug-
gage, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned: 
[The second requirement from Katz] does not mean that any kind of gov-
ernmental intrusion is permissible if it has occurred often enough. The gov-
ernment could not avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment by no-
tifying the public that all telephone lines will be tapped, or that all homes 
will be searched. ‘Airport searches’ are not outside the Amendment simply 
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because they are being conducted at all airports. In none of the Supreme 
Court decisions excluding searches or seizures from the Fourth Amend-
ment on the authority of Katz was the result based on such a rationale. Ra-
ther, in each case the individual's alleged reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy was negated on some other, independent, ground.165 
In other words, society’s reasonable expectations of privacy cannot be dimin-
ished simply because the governmental intrusions are common or recurring. Other 
circuits have discussed this issue in a comparable manner.166 After 9/11, the co-
gency of this line of reasoning is even more evident. While the threat of hijacking 
and terrorism do have an impact on the Fourth Amendment search analysis, that 
impact is on the part of the analysis focused on the reasonableness of a search, not 
whether a search has occurred in the first place. Thus, whether in an airport, or 
passing through security anywhere else, an individual still has an objective expecta-
tion of privacy when it comes to the items he has concealed on his body or in his 
luggage.167 Since both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonable expec-
tation of privacy test are met when an individual is screened by security, use of the 
Patscan to conduct that screening is a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
An additional ground for finding that use of the Patscan to scan individuals for 
concealed weapons constitutes a search can be found in the treatment of metal 
detectors by the circuit courts. In United States v. Epperson, the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals concluded that use of a metal detector was a search when it was used 
to scan an individual about to board a plane.168 The court in Epperson did not en-
gage in the two-part analysis described in Katz.169 Instead, the court stated simply 
that using a metal detector, “a government officer, without permission, discerned 
metal on Epperson’s person.”170 The court went on to explain that “the very pur-
pose and function of a [metal detector]: [is] to search for metal and disclose its 
presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of privacy.”171 Numerous 
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opinions from the other circuits cite to Epperson for this principle without engaging 
in the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis themselves.172 
The reasoning applied to metal detectors in Epperson seemingly could be ap-
plied to the Patscan as well. Like a metal detector, whose purpose and function “is 
to search for metal and disclose its presence in areas where there is a normal ex-
pectation of privacy,” the Patscan’s purpose and function is to search for weapons 
and disclose their presence in areas where there is a normal expectation of pri-
vacy.173 In other words, metal detectors search for metal, the Patscan searches for 
weapons, and both are considered “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
C. Is Using the Patscan to Search an Individual Reasonable? 
Turning to the reasonableness portion of our analysis, only the third category 
of circumstances, where there are clear state actors, need be evaluated. As ex-
plained in Part IV.A., sports stadiums, large event venues, casinos, restaurants, pri-
vate clubs, and movie theaters are all possible places for the Patscan to be used that 
likely would fall outside the bounds of the state action doctrine’s exceptions in their 
current form. Even if the government owns the property on which the private busi-
ness is located and leases it to a private actor, enforcement of security using the 
Patscan, or otherwise, is outside the scope of the entanglement and public function 
exceptions in all but a very limited number of circumstances.174 
The sections below analyze use of the Patscan for reasonableness in those cir-
cumstances where clear state action is present. Presumably, the government will 
not have obtained a warrant in any of the situations in which the Patscan might be 
used to search individuals. Therefore, reasonableness of the Patscan search will de-
pend primarily on how well it fits within one of the exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement.175 The two exceptions that are most applicable in the context of the 
Patscan are the administrative search and special needs exceptions. In both con-
texts, we will see that the courts have given substantial weight to the government’s 
goal of preventing violence. 
                                                          
 172. See Albarado, 495 F.2d at 803 (“Even the unintrusive [metal detector] walk-through is a 
search in that it searches for and discloses metal items within areas most intimate to the person where 
there is a normal expectation of privacy.”) (citing Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770); United States v. Slocum, 464 
F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972) (“The short answer to defendant’s challenge directed against use of the 
[metal detector] is provided by United States v. Epperson . . . .”); Horton v. Goose Creek Independent Sch. 
Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Epperson, 454 F.2d at 770); United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 
1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980) (comparing x-rays and metal detectors and determining that both are searches); 
United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that scans with a metal de-
tector have been “deemed a Fourth Amendment search”) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984). 
173. See PatriotOne, Patscan CMR, supra note 17. 
 174. Those circumstances being when the challenger can prove that enforcement of security di-
rectly benefits the government actor, see supra note 142 and accompanying text, which is unlikely in most 
cases, or in some jurisdictions where it has been held that private security officers with plenary arrest au-
thority granted by the state are considered state actors via the public function exception, see supra note 
143 and accompanying text, which is easily avoided. 
 175. See supra Section III.D. 
 
2019 THE PERFECT STORM: HOW NARROWING OF THE STATE 
ACTION DOCTRINE, INCONSISTENCY IN FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CASELAW, AND ADVANCING SECURITY 




i. The Administrative Search Exception 
An administrative search is a search “conducted as part of a general regulatory 
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a crimi-
nal investigation to secure evidence of crime[.]”176 Such a search may be permissi-
ble notwithstanding a lack of probable cause.177 To be constitutional, administrative 
searches must be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.178 "Un-
fortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than 
by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."179 
But an administrative search should be “as limited in its intrusiveness as is con-
sistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it.”180 
a. Airports 
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the administrative search ex-
ception applies to searches made at security checkpoints in airports. Nor has it ruled 
specifically on whether the use of a metal detector or millimeter wave scanner to 
search individuals in airports is reasonable. However, the circuit courts have held 
that use of a metal detector in an “airport screening search” is constitutionally rea-
sonable under the administrative search exception.181 The airport screening search 
is an administrative search because it is “conducted as part of a general regulatory 
scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose,” that purpose being to “pre-
vent the carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent 
hijackings.”182 
Looking to the first half of the balancing test, the government’s need to search 
individuals for weapons in airports is quite clear. In 1973, the Ninth Circuit joined 
several other circuits in determining that “the [government’s] need to prevent air-
line hijacking is unquestionably grave and urgent.”183 In our post 9/11 world, the 
government’s need to prevent weapons or explosives from being brought aboard 
aircraft is even more pressing.184 
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As for the other side of the balancing test, the courts have looked to the ca-
pabilities of “current technology” when evaluating the search’s intrusiveness.185 Be-
cause of the government’s pressing need for airport searches, they have been held 
constitutionally reasonably provided they are “no more extensive nor intensive 
than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weap-
ons or explosives . . . [and are] confined in good faith to that purpose.”186 In this 
respect, the Patscan may actually have a distinct advantage over the conventional 
metal detector and the millimeter wave machine. The Patscan is more precise than 
a metal detector because it only detects weapons and explosives, whereas metal 
detectors detect all kinds of metal objects and millimeter wave machines are in-
tended to detect all concealed objects.187 It could be argued that this increased pre-
cision makes the Patscan search less extensive than a search using a metal detector 
or millimeter wave machine. At any rate, the government’s overwhelming need to 
prevent the hijacking of aircraft means that use of the Patscan to search people for 
weapons and explosives in an airport is, in all likelihood, reasonable and constitu-
tional. 
b. Government Facilities or Buildings 
The administrative search exception’s applicability to government buildings, 
such as courthouses, capitol buildings, and city halls, is substantially the same as it 
is to airports. The government has a legitimate goal, distinct from general crime 
prevention, of “prevent[ing] destruction and injury in government facilities.”188 The 
fact that the Patscan only searches for weapons and explosives means that in theory 
it is less intrusive than alternatives, such as metal detectors and pat-down searches. 
Thus, similar to airports, the government’s interest in preventing destruction and 
injury outweighs the potential invasion of privacy. 
ii. The Special Needs Exception in Public Schools 
The Supreme Court has stated that warrantless searches that are not sup-
ported by probable cause can still be constitutional “when special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause re-
quirement impracticable.”189 The Court has also held that such “special needs” are 
present in the context of public schools.190 When applying the special needs excep-
tion, a balance must be struck between the students’ legitimate expectations of 
privacy and the legitimate need for schools to maintain order and a safe learning 
environment.191 In striking this balance, the court must look at “(1) the nature of 
the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes; (2) the character of the intru-
sion, [including] . . . whether the invasion of privacy is minimal or significant, and 
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(3) the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and the effi-
cacy of the means for meeting it.”192 
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court upheld a urinalysis drug test that was part of 
a district-wide drug policy authorizing random drug tests of student athletes.193 The 
students were found to have diminished privacy interests because of their status as 
public-school students.194 As for the character of the intrusion, the collection of 
urine samples was not a significant invasion of privacy because it was done in the 
privacy of a restroom and the samples were screened only for drugs, not underlying 
medical conditions of the students.195 Finally, the nature of the concern, deterring 
drug use by schoolchildren, was important if not compelling.196 
The Supreme Court has not ruled specifically on the reasonableness of using 
of a metal detector or millimeter wave scanner to conduct entry searches in 
schools. Although, some states have taken matters into their own hands. Tennessee 
has expressly authorized the use of metal detectors in schools through a statute.197 
State courts in New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Florida, and California have ap-
proved the use of metal detectors in schools.198 In People v. Pruitt, an Illinois ap-
peals court addressed the issue of metal detector searches in schools.199 The court 
in Pruitt emphasized that the intrusiveness of requiring students to pass through a 
metal detector is minimal because it did not involve any physical touching.200 As to 
the government’s needs, the court held that the school’s “special needs” included 
preventing violence in schools.201 In doing so, the court reflected on the loss of in-
nocence in schools that its holding represented: 
We long for the time when children did not have to pass through metal 
detectors on their way to class, when hall monitors were other children, 
not armed guards, when students dressed for school without worrying 
about gang colors. Those were the days when sharp words, crumpled balls 
of paper, and, at worst, the bully's fists were the weapons of choice.202 
However, the court went on to state: “[j]udges cannot ignore what everybody 
else knows: violence and the threat of violence are present in the public schools.”203 
Ultimately, in balancing the privacy interest of the student and the school’s “special 
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need” to prevent violence, the court held that the suspicionless metal detector 
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.204 
While the Illinois Appeals Court has limited jurisdiction, its analysis of the use 
of metal detectors in schools is still instructive on the issue of implementing Patscan 
searches in public schools. The reduced privacy interest of public school students 
and the “special need” for prevention of violence in schools remain the same. The 
Patscan is similar to a metal detector in the fact that neither device requires a phys-
ical touching of the student during the search. Under this line of reasoning, replac-
ing the metal detector with the Patscan likely would not change the outcome of 
Pruitt. Thus, a limited number of jurisdictions have likely already found that a search 
using a device such as the Patscan to screen students for weapons is reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. Based on the Supreme Court’s finding that urinalysis 
drug testing of students was reasonable in light of the government’s special need 
to prevent students from using drugs, it seems likely that the Court would also up-
hold the use of the Patscan given the government’s special need of preventing vio-
lence in schools.205 
V. CONCLUSION 
Security technology is going to continue to advance, both in sophistication and 
capability. The Patscan is just an example of the incredible advancements technol-
ogy has made in the first part of the twenty-first century. This relatively small device 
has the potential to revolutionize the look and feel of security checkpoints as we 
know them. With the enhancement of security technology, however, comes the in-
creased risk of intrusions on the right to privacy. And the current jurisprudential 
landscape is filled with pitfalls, capable of undermining privacy rights in the face of 
new technology. The narrowing of both the public function exception206 and entan-
glement exception207 to the state action requirement is one such danger. As tech-
nology advances, the blurred lines between state and private actors will become 
increasingly important. A robust state action doctrine would subject quasi-state ac-
tors to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment, ensuring that privacy interests are 
at least balanced against government and security interests. A murky and narrow 
state action doctrine will serve to allow private security forces, equipped with ad-
vanced security technology such as the Patscan, to search individuals regardless of 
whether the government could constitutionally do so. Private security officers and 
guards already outnumber sworn law enforcement officers more than two to 
one.208 Advanced security technology will put a large amount of power in their 
hands. Because of a narrow state action doctrine, they will be predominately unre-
stricted by the Fourth Amendment. 
As for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence itself, the Court has created a patch-
work of recognized privacy interests in the context of new technologies. But the 
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creeping expansion of the number and scope of exceptions to the warrant require-
ment threatens to swallow the Fourth Amendment and its protections. As the 
twenty-first century progresses, the Patscan and other advancements in technology 
will continue to make the world a safer place. But they will also strain our current 
understanding of the right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth 
Amendment. Justice Scalia was right: “[t]here can be no clarity in this area unless 
we make up our minds, and unless the principles we express comport with the ac-
tions we take.”209 If “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reason-
ableness,”210 perhaps it is time to reconsider our sacrificing of privacy for the sake 
of security. For “privacy erodes first at the margins, but once eliminated, its protec-
tions are lost for good, and the resultant damage is rarely, if ever, undone.”211 
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